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This paper reports research based on the Lipset and Meltz (1997) Canada-U.S. Labour Attitudes 
Survey data for Canada that indicates that youths have a stronger preference than do adults for 
unionisation.   It shows that most of that difference reflects the stronger desire of youths to have 
unions deal with workplace issues as compared to the exposure of youths to these issues.  
Preferences for unionisation for youths more so than for adults are influenced by social factors 
such as familial union status and the attitudes of peers, as well as by the possible roles of 
potential substitutes for unionisation such as progressive HRM practices and legislative 
protection.  Implications of the findings for the future of unionisation and the organising of youth 
are discussed. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
It is often asserted that trade unions are outmoded institutions, unable to reach a new generation 
of workers imbued with individualistic values -- values that are at odds with the collective ethos 
underpinning unionism (O’Bannon 2001: 100-101).  These assertions attribute declines in union 
membership that are occurring across most of the Western industrialised world to young people’s 
reduced desire for union membership. These claims appear to be bolstered by the fact that the 
unionisation rate for young workers (those aged 15-24) is less than half than that of adult 
workers (those aged 25+).  In particular, Britain, Canada, and the United States all display youth 
unionisation rates that are two and a half times lower than those of adult workers (Bryson et. al. 
2001: 17).    
However, to establish that the labour movement’s future is at risk because young people are 
turning their backs on unions, one has to establish two things: first, that the youth-adult 
unionisation differential is growing and, second, that this is due to a lower desire for membership 
on the part of youths compared to adults.  Our empirical evidence for Canada contradicts both of 
these claims.  Specifically, we find: (i) that the youth-adult union density differential, while 
rising slightly during the mid 1990s, remained constant throughout the decade; (ii) that the desire 
for union membership is actually higher among youths than it is among adults in our sample and 
(iii) that most of that greater demand reflects the stronger desire of youths to have unions deal 
with workplace issues, rather than the greater exposure of youths to these issues. 
Our first result clearly undermines  the main plank upon which the ‘union-movement-is-
dead’ view rests its case.  Our second finding creates somewhat of a puzzle (since the actual 
unionisation rate is much lower for youths compared to adults), but it is entirely consistent with a 
queuing model (Farber 1983:1421; 2001:17) of union membership determination in which 
 2 
unions do not represent all individuals who prefer to be in a unionised job because the costs to 
both individuals and unions of acquiring union status are unevenly spread across workers (e.g., 
organizing costs are greater for some segments of employees than for others).  Finally, our third 
finding -- that predictors of desired unionisation display greater response elasticity for youth as 
compared to adults – is compatible with a model where youth attitudes in general, and towards 
union membership in particular, are relatively more malleable.  Consequently, determinants of 
desired union membership, such as social capital and union voice procedures, should affect 
young workers to a greater extent than adults.  The reasons for these relationships are outlined in 
detail later in the text. 
The paper begins by examining unionisation rates for youths and adults in Canada.  Next, we 
turn to our specification of the determinants of preferences for unionisation, first setting out 
theoretical considerations based on a comparison of economic and social psychological models 
of union attitude formation and then presenting our empirical model.  Youth-adult differences in 
the factors that affect preferences for unionisation are then discussed.  The paper concludes with 
a summary of the main findings and a discussion of the implications of these preference 
differences for unions and management.   
 
2. Unionisation rates for youths and for adults 
Union density rates in Canada have consistently been far lower for youths than for adults.  Table 
1 shows that in the decade of the 1990s, youth density ranged from almost one-half to one-third 
of the adult rate.  This difference between youths and adults is much greater than the variation 
within the different adult subgroups where the unionisation rates are fairly similar.   As youths 
mature, the density rates of the older age cohort are similar to the density rates of the early adult 
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age group in the preceding cohort.  In 2000, the 25-44 age group had a union density rate very 
close to the rate for 25-44 year olds in 1990, and that figure is still almost double the youth rate 
in 1990 or 2000.  The stability of the youth-adult density differential (last row of Table 1) 
implies that there is no disproportionate trend towards lower union membership amongst youth.  
It is this persistence of the large adult-youth density differential that requires explaining. 
[Place Table 1 about here] 
A number of reasons have been offered in the literature for the lower union density rates 
of youths as compared to adults.  In a Canadian context, membership and coverage tend to come 
with the job (Gallager 1999: 239; Payne 1989: 113).  One obvious factor, therefore, contributing 
to low union density amongst the young is that youths occupy jobs that have low union coverage 
rates such as retail and private services (Meltz 1993: 209).  As young cohorts age they enter 
industries and occupations with higher density rates and they also move from temporary jobs to 
more long-term jobs across a wider spectrum of industries, which again increases the likelihood 
of unionisation.    
It is also reasonable to expect that youths would have a lower preference for unionisation 
than adults, since turnover rates are much higher among the young (Lowe 1998: 246) implying 
that young workers  have a lower commitment to a job and are more inclined to exercise the exit 
option than the voice option when disapproving of working conditions.  This higher turnover of 
youths implies that the perceptions of the costs and benefits of unionisation for youth would be 
expected to differ from that of adults, especially if the benefits for youth tend to come in the 
distant future (Bain and Elias 1995:81).  It is to the determinants of those preferences that we 
now turn.   
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3. Determinants of preferences for unionisation by youths and adults 
The different preferences that youths and adults have towards unionisation can be 
modelled from an economic framework that is complemented and enriched by a social 
psychological perspective.  We begin with an economic analysis of preferences for unionisation 
based on an expected utility approach advanced by Farber (2001:16) and Riddell (1993:117).  
Once we demonstrate how attitudes towards unionisation enter the standard expected utility 
framework, Montgomery’s (1999) social psychological model of self-concept formation will 
help us understand how these same preferences are shaped by family and the socialisation 
process prior to, and during, the initial stages of a working career (e.g., Barling et. al. 1991; 
Kelloway et. al. 1996) 
  Attitudes and preferences are important since they generally lead to the formation of a 
behavioral intention on the part of an individual, which, when afforded a sufficient degree of 
control over behavior, will induce that individual to carry out their intentions when the 
opportunity arises (Ajzen 1991).  Given that attitudes are important determinants of intentions, 
and that intentions are the immediate antecedents of behavior (Sutton 1998) it is not surprising to 
find that positive attitudes towards unions tend to lead to pro-union actions, such as voting for 
unions in representation elections (Fiorito 1987:282; Montgomery 1989).  Attitudes towards 
unions, therefore, are an important ingredient in sustaining or replenishing membership.   
3.1 An economic model of union preferences  
Following Farber (1983: 1421) and Riddell (1993: 119), the conventional assumption among 
labour economists is that workers have stable preferences for unionisation, and that individuals 
will prefer unionisation if the expected utility of a union job exceeds that of a non-union job.  
This in turn depends upon the costs and benefits of unionisation as affected by such factors as the 
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expected union wage premium and non-wage aspects of employment such as relationships with 
supervisors and chances for promotion or layoff.  The utility associated with unionisation will 
also be affected by unmeasured attitudes reflecting tastes or preferences towards union 
membership.   
It is this latter inclination of an individual -- to be either ‘pro-union’ or ‘anti-union’ 
independent of the benefits and costs of unionisation -- that is of particular relevance in the 
context of youth-adult differences in preferences for unionisation.  Traditionally, economists 
treat independent tastes for unionisation as fixed, but such preference formation can be better 
understood by extending the economic framework through social-psychological models of 
preference formation. 
3.2 A social psychological model of union preference formation 
Rather than utilizing a utility function, as do economists, social psychologists talk about the self 
and the process by which self-concepts are formed (Aronson 1988).  We utilise that perspective 
by arguing that young workers start off essentially as ‘black boxes’ with no well-defined self-
concept concerning unionisation.  Their preferences concerning union membership are therefore 
malleable (Lowe and Rastin 2000:203) and are substantially influenced by social background 
(e.g., whether a family member is a member of a union or not) and the attitudes of peers (e.g., 
whether family and friends are generally supportive of unions).  The importance of family and 
the socialisation process prior to, and during, the initial stages of a working career is emphasised, 
for example, in Barling et. al. (1991) and Kelloway et. al. (1996).  The socialisation process is 
further influenced by the nature of early workplace experiences (e.g., whether a worker is 
employed in a unionised or a non-unionised environment).  The importance of initial exposures 
to unions and preferences for unionisation throughout the life course is emphasised in Freeman 
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and Diamond (2001), and for youths in particular by Fullagar and Barling (1989), Fullagar et. al. 
(1995), and Payne (1989).   Following Coleman (1988), this vector of various social factors 
which influence demand for unionisation can be grouped under the heading social capital. 
 Building upon this foundation of social capital, the socialisation process for any given 
worker can be summarised using Montgomery’s (1999: 6) attribution model of self-concept 
formation. The dynamics of the self-attribution model depend on the assumptions one makes 
about the self-concept and how well defined it is before a worker enters the labour market. A 
young worker with little or no employment experience has a different dynamic than an adult 
worker with many years of labour market experience. Youth preferences are established early 
and solidify with age and experience (Lowe and Rastin, 2000:216). The ordering of the feedback 
model reflects this process, with a young worker first influenced by social capital (e.g., familial 
union status and prevailing social and workplace norms) which leads to certain individual actions 
(e.g., applying for union jobs or participation in organising drives). These actions are then 
internalised through attributions such as beliefs about the importance of loyalty to an employer 
or ideals concerning individual or collective solutions to workplace problems. Youth idealism in 
the unionisation process is emphasised, for example, in Cregan and Johnston (1990). Finally, it is 
through these attributions that a pro-or anti-union self-concept is formed, which in turn feeds 
back into the initial social capital of the community, continuing to fuel the dynamic 
intergenerational process of preference formation outlined above. Summarizing the schematic 
laid out in Montgomery (1999: 6), the dynamic process moves from (1) social capital to (2) 
individual actions to (3) internalisation through attribution formation to (4) self-concept 
formation which in turn feeds back into social capital formation in following periods. 
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 The modelling framework above implies that as workers mature and gain labour market 
experience, the proclivity to be for or against unionisation becomes more inelastic (i.e., less 
responsive to alteration from social forces and prevailing workplace norms).  As workers age, 
preferences become more fixed as opposed to being responsive to other variables.  This has 
important implications for unions and their organisers, as it indicates that although youths make 
up only 1/5 of all union members, they are attitudinally amenable to union membership, whereas 
adults appear to be less sensitive to altering their preferences for union representation based on 
factors found inside and outside of the workplace.   
 
4.  Econometric analysis procedures  
Our dependent variable is a measure of preferences for unionisation based on the response to the 
survey question “All things considered, if you had a choice, would you personally prefer to 
belong to/ remain in a labour union or not?” (hereafter simply referred to as preferring a union).  
Logistic regression equations are estimated separately for youths and adults, based on the 
dichotomous dependent variable coded 1 if respondents would prefer to belong to a union, and 0 
if not.  The 12.8 % of respondents who indicated “did not know” to the question on their 
preference for a union were omitted from the analysis since they could not logically be grouped 
as being closer to either the yes or the no category, and a separate analysis of the “did not know” 
category did not seem merited.  The results are very similar if they are grouped with the 
respondents who indicated “no”. 
Our independent variables are drawn from survey responses that reflect the perceived 
costs and benefits of unionisation for youth and adult workers.  The independent variables are 
grouped into five general categories: (i) social capital indicators (whether union member in the 
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family, and whether family and friends support unions); (ii) attitudes towards traditional union 
policies (positive attitude towards pay standardisation; positive view of worker political power; 
preference for layoffs based on seniority; perception that collective solutions to work problems 
are best); (iii) perceptions about the employer and the job (feel no loyalty to employer; feels 
employees are  treated unfairly at work; perceives poor opportunity for advancement at work; 
worried about layoffs); (iv) union-voice substitutes (no progressive HRM practices at job; feels 
unprotected by workplace law); and, (v) individual characteristics (gender; union status; political 
position).  How each variable is measured is detailed in Table 2.  Our explanatory variables are 
coded such that a positive coefficient is expected.  
[Place Table 2 about here] 
As outlined in Nielson (1998:116), for binary coded dependent variables as in logistic 
regressions, the difference in probabilities of preferring membership can be decomposed into one 
part which is caused by differing propensities (R) and another part which is explained by 
differences in characteristics (C) between youths (y) and adults (a). Using adults as the standard, 
the average estimated probability of desired unionisation for both age groups is given by 
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where (1) is the preferred rate of union membership amongst adults that would be predicted if 
each adult worker retained his or her ‘union-preferring’ individual and workplace characteristics, 
but the impacts of those characteristics on the probability of preferring to belong to a union were 
the same as those estimated for youths. The intergenerational union preference gap can then be 
decomposed using the following identity, which defines R and C:  
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The term R is the average probability that D=1 for adults minus the average probability that D=1 
if adults reacted like youth. The term C is the average probability that D=1 for adults if they 
reacted like youth minus the average probability that D=1 for youths. 
From an empirical perspective, the modelling framework outlined in Section 3 implies 
that the response parameters (i.e., coefficients) to social capital and various other determinants of 
unionisation will be larger for youths than for comparable adults.  As well, the cumulative effect 
of this greater responsiveness on the part of youths should explain a larger portion of the overall 
difference in the preferences on the part of youths compared to adults for unionisation.  That is, 
in the decomposition analysis, the component due to response differences (coefficients) between 
youths and adults should be greater than the component due to differences between youths and 
adults in their characteristics (independent variables). 
 
5. The data and limitations 
Our empirical analysis of the preferences for unionisation utilises data from the Lipset and Meltz 
(1997) Canada-U.S. Labour Attitudes Survey for Canada.  The survey utilized quota sampling 
(Kervin 1992: 220) to generate a representative sample of workers by determining how many 
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responses were needed to obtain representativeness over observable characteristics based on 
Census data (e.g., region, gender, age and employment status) and then contacting households 
until those sample targets are met .  Quota sampling does not have a sampling frame and hence 
there is no conventional “response rate” since there is no randomly drawn target sample from 
which a proportion of valid responses can be drawn.  Of those contacted, however, 58.7% 
responded.  Given that quota sampling is designed specifically to ensure a representative sample 
across various observable characteristics (based on Census data in this case), it is not surprising 
that the survey characteristics match very closely the population characteristics as given by the 
Census (Table 3). 
[Place Table 3 about here] 
The purpose of the survey was to determine attitudes toward work, institutions and social 
policy.  Information was obtained on general values of workers, including views on 
individualism versus group or communitarian orientation, the appropriate role of governments, 
confidence in institutions, and perceptions of labour market outcomes such as their expectations 
about layoffs.   
The Angus Reid Group, one of Canada’s leading public opinion survey firms, 
administered the survey through telephone calls - which averaged 20-26 minutes per respondent 
- in June and early July 1996.  The survey yielded a representative sample of 1495 working-age 
people in Canada.  Cases were eliminated in our analysis if they were missing observations on 
the dependent variable, reducing our sample to 1,204 (1,057 adults and 147 youths). 
The small youth sample makes it is more difficult to obtain precise estimates of the 
underlying relationship for youths compared to the larger sample of adults.  We sustained the 
youth sample size in part by including 40 non-employed respondents with the 107 who were 
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employed at the time of the survey. The non-employed were asked all questions except on 
perceptions of work conditions and jobs, and on union voice substitutes, that is, those in groups 
(iii) and (iv) above.  Their responses were coded as “unknown” for these questions.  For all other 
questions they are treated as regular respondents, responding with their views of the situation.  
The preferences of the non-employed are important since many are looking for work and others 
are about to obtain work.  We can assume that they respond to questions based on their past or 
expected status or on their general view of those situations.  Their responses are meaningful 
since our goal is to capture general preferences for unionisation, not whether one would vote for 
a union at his or her particular job.   
  Including the non-employed in the analysis is further buttressed by the fact that we also 
ran the model with an added non-employed dummy variable (compared to employed).  The logit 
coefficient of 0.053 was statistically insignificant (p = 0.97), yielding a marginal effect of 0.01.  
That is, there was virtually no difference in the preferences for unionisation between the 
employed versus non-employed.  Furthermore, the other coefficients (unreported but available 
from the authors on request) remained virtually unchanged.  In spite of this similarity between 
the preferences of the employed and non-employed, we regard the small sample for youths as a 
limitation of our analysis.  We would have preferred to have a larger sample for youths both to 
obtain more precise estimates and to be able to restrict the analysis only to the employed.  
 A second limitation of our analysis – common method variance – may arise if 
respondents with certain characteristics may self-report in a way that systematically affects both 
independent and dependent variables, giving rise to spurious correlation.  As emphasised by 
Hartley and Barling (1998:167) once the survey data has been collected there is little that can be 
done other than recognising the possible limitation and interpreting the results with caution.  
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6.  Results  
A Chow-type test (Greene 2000: 826) on the similarity of the coefficients in the youth and adult 
equations yielded a Likelihood Ratio of 394.72 which is well above the critical value of 135.81 
at the 0.01 level of significance from the chi-squared distribution.  This indicates that the 
underlying structure (i.e., coefficients) of the two equations were significantly different from 
each other so that separate equations are appropriate. 
6.1 Decomposition analysis and overall picture 
 
As indicated in Table 4, 56.7 percent of youths in our sample (row 1) compared to 49.8 percent 
of adults (row 2) expressed a preference to belong to a union, for an overall difference of 6.9 in 
favour of youths preferring unions (row 6).  As indicated in row 4, about two-thirds (62 percent) 
of the higher preference of youths for unionisation can be attributed to the greater response of 
youths to prefer unionisation, and about one third (38 percent as indicated in row 5) can be 
attributed to the fact that youths are more exposed to the social capital, workplace issues or 
attitudes that give rise to a greater preference for unionisation to deal with such issues in general.  
This finding also confirms our hypothesis that older respondents have a more hardened attitude 
towards unions that cannot be so readily dislodged by external influences. 
[Place Table 4 about here] 
Table 5 indicates the separate impact of each of the various independent variables 
influencing the probability of preferring unionisation amongst youths and adults in Canada.  As 
is conventional, marginal effects or changes in probabilities are reported, calculated from the 
logit coefficients that are also given in Table 5. 
[Place Table 5 about here] 
In general, the results confirm our hypothesis that youth are more responsive than adults 
to the determinants of preferences for unionisation.  That is, the changes in probabilities are 
 13 
generally larger and more often statistically significant for youths (column 3) compared to adults 
(column 7).  In part as a result of this, youths have a stronger overall desire for unionisation than 
do adults as discussed previously in the decomposition analysis and as indicated in the first row 
of the table whereby 56.7 percent of youths and 49.8 percent of adults in our sample indicate that 
they would prefer a union.  The subsequent rows show the effects of various characteristics on 
the preferences for union membership.  Both the sample means of the explanatory variables and 
the effect they have on the probability of preferring unionisation (i.e., the logit coefficients 
translated into changes in probability) are discussed and compared since each provide interesting 
information on youth-adult differences in unionisation.   
6.1 The effects of social capital and social norms 
Persons who have a union member in the family are themselves much more likely to prefer 
unionisation, with the effect being more than three times as strong for youths compared to adults.  
Specifically, the probability of preferring unions is 0.37 higher for youths from families with an 
existing union member, while it is 0.11 higher for adults in the same circumstances.  As 
anticipated from the social psychological model of union preference formation, families are a 
more important influence in shaping the preferences of youths than is the case for adults. 
 A similar pattern prevails for the influence of family and friends and their support for 
unionisation.  That is, the influence of family and friends is important for both youths and adults, 
but once again stronger for youths than for adults.  Specifically, the probability of preferring 
unions is 0.41 higher for youths whose family and friends support unions, compared to 0.29 
higher for adults in the same circumstances.  The influence of family and friends is therefore 
much stronger in determining the preferences for youths than for adults. 
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6.2 The effects of traditional union policies 
The probability of preferring a union is higher amongst persons who prefer pay standardisation 
as opposed to merit-based pay.  This is understandable given that unions also generally prefer 
such pay standardisation.  The effect is almost twice as large for youth (0.30) compared to adults 
(0.18) highlighting our proposition that youths are more responsive than are adults to the factors 
that influence preferences for unionisation in general.  The sample means also indicate that 
approximately 20 percent of youths tend to have a positive attitude to pay standaridisation, with a 
slightly higher figure for adults. 
 Not surprisingly, the probability of preferring unionisation is considerably higher for 
persons who also feel that workers should have more political power.  The impact is especially 
large for youth (0.34) compared to adults (0.23).  The mean values also indicate that 
proportionately more youths (77 percent) compared to adults (61percent) in our sample think that 
workers should have more political power.  In essence, youths have a more positive view of 
workers having political power compared to adults and youths are more prepared to act on it by 
supporting unionisation. 
The proportion of respondents who follow the traditional union policy of preferring 
layoffs based solely on seniority was lower for youths (0.36) than for adults (0.42).   These 
differences are not as large as one may have expected given that layoffs based on seniority as 
opposed to merit would disproportionately benefit adults.  Those youths who do believe that 
layoffs should be based only on seniority, however, do not seem prepared to translate their 
beliefs into reality by supporting unions (i.e., their coefficients on preferring unions are 
insignificant for youths).  Adults who believe that layoffs should be based on seniority, however, 
are much more likely to act on their beliefs by supporting unions since unions would help 
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translate those beliefs into reality by supporting the seniority principle (i.e., the coefficient on 
preferring unions is positive, large and significant for adults who support the seniority principle). 
 The proportion of youths and adults in our sample who believe that individual solutions 
to workplace problems are better than collective solutions is fairly similar for youths and adults.  
The fact that almost half of each group responded they “did not know” to this question (see note 
at bottom of Table 3) suggests that substantial numbers could be persuaded to support either 
collective or individual policies (e.g., unions or progressive HRM practices).    
Even though similar proportions of youths and adults in our sample feel that collective 
solutions to workplace problems are better than individual solutions, adults seem more willing to 
act on their views through supporting unions (i.e., the adult coefficient is positive and significant, 
P = 0.02, while the youth coefficient is insignificant, P = 0.61).  This is one of the few areas 
where adults seem more willing than youths (i.e., where the magnitude of the coefficient was 
greater for adults than for youths) to express a greater preference for unionisation when they had 
a belief that was conducive to unionisation. 
6.3  The effect of working conditions and job characteristics 
Adults who feel no loyalty to their employer or who do not know if they feel loyalty to their 
employer are 0.16 more likely to prefer a union, compared to adults who feel loyalty to their 
employer (although this effect is significant only at the 0.12 level).   For youths, the effect is 
statistically insignificant (P = 0.73). 
The effect of the perception of employees being treated unfairly is more dramatic for 
youths.  Specifically, the probability of preferring unions is 0.42 greater for youths who perceive 
employees are being treated unfairly, compared to youths who do not perceive employees as 
being treated unfairly.  For adults, the impact of unfair treatment is small (0.07) and statistically 
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insignificant.  Importantly, the sample means indicate that 58 percent of youths compared to only 
13 percent of adults perceive employees as being treated unfairly at their workplace.  In essence, 
youths have a much stronger perception of unfair treatment at the workplace and are more 
prepared to support unionisation as a result.  The substantial numbers of both youths and adults 
who reported that they “did not know” whether employees are treated unfairly at work (see note 
at bottom of Table 3) suggests that substantial numbers could be influenced by unions or by 
progressive HRM practices that would facilitate fair treatment at work. 
 The mean values indicate that the same proportion of youths and adults (around 31 
percent) tend to think they have poor opportunity for advancement.  Interestingly, this has an 
opposite effect on youths compared to adults.  Adults who feel they have a poor opportunity for 
advancement are more likely to prefer unions, while for youths the opposite is the case (although 
statistically insignificant).  This is not surprising given that the seniority principle followed by 
unions is apt to favour adult opportunities for advancement at the expense of young workers.   
 Only about 19 percent of youths, compared to 31.5 percent of adults in our sample, worry 
about layoffs, perhaps reflecting the lower cost of layoffs to youths and the fact that they expect 
to be laid off given the practice of “last-in, first-out”.  The different impact that this concern for 
layoffs has on preferences for unionisation between youths and adults, however, is large – 
increasing the probability of preferring a union by 42 percent for youths with zero impact for 
adults.  This is somewhat surprising since unions would tend to foster the last-in, first-out 
phenomenon that tends to put youths at more risk of layoffs, compared to adults.    
6.4 The effect of union voice substitutes  
A lack of progressive HRM practices at work (e.g., self-directed work teams, total quality 
management, quality circles, employee involvement programs, as defined earlier in Table 2) 
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leads to a large preference for unions on the part of youths, but no effect on the preferences of 
adults.  This highlights the possibility that progressive HRM practices can be a substitute for 
unionisation (a concern long recognized in the literature) especially in the minds of younger 
workers in the years when their preferences for their ‘ideal’ working environment are being 
shaped.  It also highlights the understandable resistance that unions often have to such practices 
since they are a viable threat to unions, especially for the new generation of workers that have 
not been raised under a history of unionism.  
 Similar portions of adults and youths in our sample felt that they were protected by 
workplace law (51 percent).  The fact that slightly over 30 percent (see note at bottom of Table 
3) of both youths and adults did not know if they felt protected again highlights the substantial 
numbers who could be influenced by such protection (to the extent that it is a substitute for the 
protection provided by unions).  This is especially the case for youths since those who felt that 
they were not protected by workplace law were 0.35 more likely to prefer a union than were 
youths who felt they were protected by such laws.   
6.5  The effect of individual characteristics 
The preference for unionisation is lower for male compared to female youths, and the opposite 
for male compared to female adults.  This is one of the few variables that has a sign difference 
between youths and adults.  The sign reversal is consistent with unions catering to male 
preferences for older persons, but shifting towards female preferences, as women become more 
prominent in the workforce and in unions.  The effects, however, are statistically insignificant, 
marginally so in the case of youths (p = 0.11) and more so in the case of adults (p = 0.19). 
 The preference for unionisation is vastly higher for both youths and adults who are 
currently union members compared to those who are not union members.  Youths who are union 
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members are 0.36 more likely to prefer unionisation than are youths who are not union members, 
and the effect is slightly larger for adults.  The fact that union members (for both youths and 
adults) prefer unionisation suggests that the number who want to remain certified vastly 
outweighs the number of union members who would prefer decertification.   
 As indicated by the sample mean values, the political orientation of youths and adults in 
terms of left, right and centre on the political spectrum are remarkably similar.  This is somewhat 
surprising given the perception that people become more conservative as they age, but it is 
consistent with the perspective that youths today are more conservative than youths of yesterday.   
As expected, persons at the centre and especially on the left in the political spectrum are more 
likely to prefer unions than are persons on the right of the spectrum, although the effects are not 
statistically significant for youths (P = 0.22). 
 
7.  Conclusions  
Our analysis of the preferences for unionisation on the part of youths and adults gives rise 
to the following generalisations: 
 Youths have a stronger preference than do adults for unions in general and most of that 
reflects the stronger desire of youths to have unions deal with workplace issues, than it 
reflects the exposure of youths to these issues.  Conversely, as workers age they appear to 
have a weaker preference for unions to deal with workplace issues. 
 The preferences of young workers for unionisation are malleable and strongly shaped by 
their accumulated social capital, such as union membership in the family and the attitudes of 
family and friends towards unions, highlighting the cumulative and inter-generational effects 
that can be involved in the transmission of union status. 
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• Substitutes for unionisation such as progressive HRM practices and legislative protection 
also have a powerful effect on young workers’ preferences for unionisation. The fact that 
youths who felt unprotected by labour law had a strong preference for unions highlights the 
conventional dilemma that unions face in this area.  They may support protective legislation 
for reasons of social justice and because it can raise the cost of non-union labour relative to 
union labour that already has that protection through the collective agreement.  But such 
legislation can also be a substitute for unionisation to the extent that it reduces the need to 
provide the protection through unionisation. 
 Large number of respondents indicated that they “did not know” whether collective or 
individual solutions were better, or whether employees were treated unfairly at work, or 
whether they felt unprotected by workplace law. This highlights the substantial number of 
youths who could be persuaded into individual or collective solutions (e.g., progressive HRM 
practices or unions) to deal with such workplace issues. 
Our analysis implies that there is a large potential among youths in our sample to either 
support or oppose unionisation, depending on the views of family and friends about unions and 
depending on conditions inside the workplace.  In essence, unions have an opportunity to 
increase the rate of unionisation among youth if youths become more acquainted with unions and 
if they are in workplaces where they believe that employees are not being fairly treated. 
Investment by unions in education and organizing can have a long-term payoff for the labour 
movement. By tilting the taste for unionisation more strongly in the positive direction, any union 
organizing and educational programme targeted to today’s youth can have a multiplier effect on 
successive generations because as workers age, independent predictors of union preferences 
become less important and less effective in shifting tastes for unionisation. 
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The large impacts of the “union member in the family” and the “family and friends 
support unions” variables, offers one explanation for the cumulative, snowballing effect that 
occurs when initial union decline seems to foster subsequent union decline, as in the U.S. over 
the last three decades.  If union membership begins to fall, then it is less likely that there will be 
a union member in the family, and less likely that family and friends will support unions 
(especially given the earlier positive effect of union status on preferences for unionisation).  In 
such circumstances, union decline begets further union decline, given the much stronger effect 
that these variables have on youths as compared to adults.  The implications of this finding for 
union organizing are striking, since the intergenerational transmission of non-union forms of 
social capital will persist as young cohorts mature and continue working throughout their 
lifecycle.  Of course, the same process works in the opposite direction.  Effective union 
organising today can have multiplier effects well into the future, as it leads to more union family 
members and more union friendly family and peers, both of which enhance preferences for 
unionisation, especially amongst youths upon which future unionisation is built. 
A number of surprises in our empirical study also add to possibilities for organising 
youth.  Relative to adults, youth have a more supportive view of worker political power and they 
are only slightly more supportive of merit as a basis for layoffs.  Youths are more positive about 
unions than are adults and this is a potential that unions can build upon.  The fact that almost half 
of the youth had no views on individual versus collective solutions to problems in the workplace 
adds further credence to the perspective that the views of youth are malleable.  This can perhaps 
account for the large discrepancy between greater stated desire for union membership and lower 
realised demand for unionisation (union density at the time of the survey was only 13.0 percent 
for youths compared to 36.0 percent for adults, even though youth had a stronger preference for 
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unions than did adults).   It also means that the manner in which unions and management 
ultimately respond to the views and needs of young persons will have a strong influence on the 
future of unions and of workplace practices.   
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Youth: 15-24 17.1 10.7 12.4 
Adult: 25+ 38.7 35.7 33.6 
   25-44  36.7 31.8 30.3 
   45-54 44.9 44.1 41.5 
   55+ 40.4 35.7 34.4 
∆ [Adult-Youth] 21.6 25.0 22.0 
    
 
Source: Calculated from data given in Perspectives on Labour and Income (various issues) 
Statistics Canada 75-001-XPE. 1990 data from the Spring 1996 volume; 1997 data from the 
Winter 1997 volume; and 2000 data found from the Autumn 2001 volume.  
 
 † Since January 1997, data on union membership has been collected as part of the Labour Force 
Survey (LFS) and this is used for our 1997 and 2000 data. The 1990 data is drawn from the 
Labour Market Activity Survey (LMAS), which was undertaken as a supplement to the monthly 
LFS.  The LMAS is based on a sample of approximately 30,000 Canadian households, and the 




Variable Definitions Based on 1996 Angus Reid Survey Questionnaire 




Prefer union membership 
 
Independent Variables 




Social Capital  
(No union member in family) Does any other member of your family belong to a union - such as a spouse or your parents? 
Union member in family  
Do not know if union member in family  
  
(Family and friends do not support unions) 
Most of my family and close friends don't like unions. [4pt scale: Strongly agree, Moderately agree, 
Moderately disagree, Strongly disagree] 
Family and friends support unions  
Do not know whether family and friends oppose unions  
  
Attitudes to Traditional Union Policies  
(Negative attitude to pay standardization) Imagine two workers of the same age, with the same years of service with their employer, doing nearly  
Positive  attitude to pay standarization the same job. One earns [X] a week more than the other. The better-paid worker is quicker and more  
Do not know attitude to pay standarization efficient at the job. In your opinion how fair or unfair is it that one of these workers is paid more than the  
 other? [4pt scale: Very unfair, Somewhat unfair, Somewhat fair, Very fair] 
  
(Negative view of worker political power) 
Workers should have more political power. [4pt scale: Strongly disagree, Moderately disagree, Moderately 
sagree, Strongly agree] 
Positive view of worker political power  
Do not know attitude to worker political power  
  
(Layoffs based on merit only) All things being equal, should a company that has to lay off people do this on the basis of seniority or  
Layoffs based merit and seniority merit? [Select from categories indicating merit, merit and seniority or seniority only] 
Layoffs based on seniority only  
Do not know how layoffs should be based  
  
(Individual solution to work problems best) How would you prefer to solve a workplace problem of your own? Would you feel more comfortable  
Collective solution to work problem best dealing directly with management yourself, or would you feel comfortable having a group of your fellow  
Do not know which is better Employees help you deal with management?  
  
Perceptions of Working Conditions  
(Feels loyalty to employer) How loyal would you say you feel towards your employer?  
Feels no loyalty to employer [4pt scale: Very loyal, Fairly loyal, Not very Loyal, Not loyal at all] 
Does not know how loyal  
  
(Employees treated fairly) Job Rating: Treatment of employees by management [4pt scale: Very good, Good, Poor, Very poor] 
Employees treated unfairly  
Do not know how employees treated  
  
(Good advancement opportunities) Job Rating: Opportunities for advancement [4pt scale: Very good, Good, Poor, Very poor] 
Poor advancement opportunities  
Do not know opportunities for advancement  
  
(Not worried about layoffs) How worried are you that your company will be laying off or cutting jobs in the near future?  
Worried about layoffs Are you [4pt scale: Not worried at all, Not very worried, Somewhat worried, Very worried] 
Do not know whether will be laid off  
  
Union Voice Substitutes  
(No progressive HRM at work) Some companies are organizing workplace decision-making in new ways to get employees more  
Presence of progressive HRM at work involved – using things like self-directed work teams, total quality management, quality circles, or other  
Do not know whether HRM at work employee involvement programs. Is anything like this now being done by your employer? [YES…NO] 
  
(Employees protected by law) Do you feel that you are already protected by the law, against unfair treatment by your employer? 
Employees not protected by law [YES…NO] 
Do not know how protected employees are  
  




(Politically right of centre) How would you describe your political views? Would you say you lean 
Politically left of centre [Far to the righ, Moderately to the right, In the political centre, Moderately to the left, Far to the left] 
Centre of political spectrum  
Do not know  
  
(Non-union)  
Phrase in brackets ( ) for the independent variables of column 1 represents  the excluded reference category in regression analysis as given in Table 5. 
To create single dummy variable response categories (and preserve degrees of freedom), scaled responses, like the 4 point scales of column 2, were combined into the 
independent variable categories of column 1, by grouping the first two scales (e.g., very loyal, fairly loyal) into the first category (e.g., feels loyalty to employer) and 











Comparison of Lipset-Meltz Survey and Census Means  
 
 




Region British Columbia 12.3 12.7 
 Alberta 9.3 9.3 
 Saskatchewan 3.6 3.5 
 Manitoba 4.1 3.9 
 Ontario 36.9 37.5 
 Quebec 25.2 24.9 
 New Brunswick 2.9 2.6 
 Nova Scotia 3.2 3.2 
 Prince Edward Island 0.6 0.5 
 Newfoundland 2.0 2.0 
    
Gender Male 49.3 49.1 
 Female 50.7 50.9 
    
Age 15-24 10.9 13.1 
 25-34 19.7 23.8 
 35-44 26.0 21.4 
 45-54 19.3 14.5 
 55-64 12.9 11.7 
 65+ 11.2 15.5 
    
Employment status Full time 49.5 47.4 
 Part time 12.9 11.0 
 Not Employed 37.7 41.6 
    




Decomposing the Adult-Youth Difference in the Probability 













2. Average adult probability of preferring union membership 49.8 
 
 



















‡ The numbers in brackets represent the proportion (expressed in percentages) of the total 
difference in adult-youth preferences. 
 




















































aPaPyPaP −+−=−  : Total difference due to propensities (R) and characteristics (C). 
 29 
    
 
TABLE 5 – Factors Influencing Probability of Preferring to Belong to a Union, Youths - Adults, Canada, 
 
         Youths (16-24) Adults (25-64)
 Means+ Logit Coef. ∆ Probability Sig. Level Means+ Logit Coef. ∆ Probability Sig. Level 
Independent variables         (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Overall mean of dependent variable .567    .498    
         
Social Capital         
(No union member in family) .343    .412    
Union member in family .359 2.39       .368** 0.02 .319 0.46 .113** 0.00
         
(Family & friends oppose unions) .384    .449    
Family & friends support unions  .542        3.65 .414** 0.00 .506 1.32 .290** 0.00
         
Attitudes to Traditional Union Policies         
(Negative attitude to pay standarization)         .789 .772
Positive attitude to pay standarization         .203 1.62 .302* 0.08 .223 0.75 .179** 0.00
         
(Negative view of worker political power)         .213 .358
Positive view of  worker political power         .771 1.96 .336** 0.02 .614 0.99 .229* 0.00
         
(Prefer layoffs based on merit only) .608    .537    
Prefer layoffs based on merit & seniority         .029 1.13 .235 0.47 .044 0.95 .219** 0.01
Prefer layoff based on seniority only         .363 0.26 .061 0.72 .419 0.85 .200** 0.00
         
(Individual solution to work problems best) .337    .327    
Collective solution to work problems best         .233 0.55 .127 0.61 .193 0.56 .139** 0.02
         
Perceptions of Working Conditions and Job          
(Feels loyalty to employer) .645    .641    
Feels no loyalty to employer or unknown         .355 -0.49 -.123 0.73 .359 0.65 .157 0.12
         
(Employees treated fairly at work) .213    .564    
Employees treated unfairly at work        .578 3.98 .419** 0.03 .133 .133 .071 .071
         
(Good or unknown opportunity to advance) .686    .684    
Poor opportunity to advance at work         .314 -1.02 -.246 0.27 .316 0.25 .063 0.24
         
(Not worried about layoffs or unknown) .812    .685    
Worried about layoffs .188 3.80       .416** 0.02 .315 0.00 .001 0.98
         
Union Voice Substitutes         
(Have progressive HRM at job) .255    .387    
No progressive HRM at job .407        4.92 .427** 0.00 .335 0.15 .036 0.49
         
(Feel protected by workplace law) .510    .511    
Feel unprotected by workplace law .169        2.19 .354* 0.07 .172 0.12 .030 0.62
         
Individual Characteristics         
(Female) .472        .498
Male         .528 -1.09 -.262 0.11 .502 0.22 .055 0.19
         
(Non-union respondent)         .790 .544
Union respondent .210 2.19 .355**      0.03 .456 2.22 .404** 0.00
         
(Politically right of centre) .205    .197    
Politically at centre .524 1.25       .254 0.22 .502 0.71 .170** 0.00
Politically left of centre .188 1.29       .260 0.22 .183 1.04 .239** 0.00
Sample Size  147        147 - - 1057 1057 - -
 
+ The means indicate the proportion of respondents in each category.  If they do not sum to 1, differences reflect the “did not know” responses that were included in the regression 
but not reported here. 
Significance level:  P< 0.05**; 0.10*. 
Excluded reference category for independent variable given in brackets ( ) in the independent variable column.   
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